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Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: Daubert's
Gatekeeping Method Expanded To Apply To
All Expert Testimony
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that while the Daubert factors for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony are neither determinative nor exhaustive, the
gatekeeping function articulated in Daubert requires an examination of
the reliability of all types of expert testimony
and is not limited in
2
application to scientific expert testimony.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Patrick Carmichael, Luzviminda Carmichael, Carina Horn,
Patrick Carmichael, Jr., Leona Carmichael, Shameela Carmichael, and
Natimah Carmichael, were all injured in a single vehicle accident in
Baldwin County, Alabama on July 6, 1993. Additionally, Janice Horn,
another passenger, died from the injuries she received in this accident.
The accident occurred when the driver and owner of the vehicle, Patrick
Carmichael, lost control of the vehicle after the right rear tire blew out.
The vehicle overturned, ejecting six of its eight occupants.3
Patrick Carmichael purchased the Ford Aerostar XL minivan on April
30, 1993 from a Dodge dealership in Washington state. The odometer
at the time of sale registered 88,997 miles and had registered an
additional 7011 miles at the time of the accident. The failed tire was a
Hercules Superior XII Steel Belted Radial designed by defendant and
manufactured in the Republic of South Korea in 1988. A visual
examination of the tire revealed that it had been punctured by a nail or
screw at some point and the remaining exterior holes had not been filled
properly.4

1.
2.
3.
4.

526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 141.
Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1516 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
Id. at 1516-17.
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Plaintiffs brought a diversity suit against Kumho Tire on October 20,
1993, claiming the tire that blew out was defective.5 Plaintiffs retained
a tire failure analyst, Dennis Carlson,' who intended to testify that in
his opinion the blowout was caused by a defect in the manufacture or
design of the tire.7 Carlson relied on some basic features of tire
technology and design;8 however, defendants disputed his method of
determining whether a defect or abuse caused the tire to blow out. 9
During Carlson's visual examination of the tire, he concluded that the
accident was caused when the tread of the tire separated from the inner
steel belted carcass.1" Carlson determined that this separation could
be caused from either a defect or overdeflection, a type of tire abuse."
Carlson noted that there are four physical indicators normally present
on a tire when overdeflection is the cause of failure: "(1) greater tread
wear on the shoulder than in the center of the tire; (2) sidewall
deterioration or discoloration; (3) abnormal bead grooving on the tire;
and (4) rim flange impressions." 2 According to Carlson's method, when
he visually fails to find at least two of these physical elements present,
he concludes the failure was not caused by overdeflection and, therefore,

5. Id. at 1517. The causes of action included in the amended complaint were an action
"under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, negligence/wantonness,
and breach of warranty." Id.
6. Id. at 1518. Carlson had a masters degree in mechanical engineering and had
worked in the area of tire design for Michelin America for 10 years. At the time of this
action, he was employed by George R. Edwards and Associates, Inc. as a mechanical
engineer. While his qualifications were in dispute, the court did not examine this issue
and, for the purposes of summary judgment, assumed he was qualified as an expert on the
subject. Id.
7. Id. at 1519.
8. 526 U.S. at 142. The Court described the undisputed features of tire technology
relied upon in part by Carlson as follows:
A steel-belted radial tire ... is made up of a "carcass" containing many layers of
flexible cords, called "plies," along which (between the cords and the outer tread)
are laid steel strips called "belts." Steel wire loops, called "beads," hold the cords
together at the plies' bottom edges. An outer layer, called the "tread," encases the
carcass, and the entire tire is bound together in rubber, through the application
of heat and various chemicals. The bead of the tire sits upon a "bead seat," which
is part of the wheel assembly. That assembly contains a 'rim flange," which
extends over the bead and rests against the side of the tire.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. 923 F. Supp. at 1520.
10. Id. at 1519.
11. Id. Overdeflection is the result of overinflating a tire, underinflating a tire, or both.
Id.
12. Id.
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must have been caused by a manufacturing or design defect. 13 Using
this method Carlson determined there was insufficient evidence to
indicate overdeflection and, therefore, concluded that the blowout must
have been caused by a manufacturing or design defect."
Defendant sought summary judgment from the district court, arguing
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 5 that Carlson's
testimony was inadmissible as expert testimony. 8 The district court
first noted that "Daubertimposed upon trial courts a sort of gatekeeper
function in accordance with which they must 'ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.'" 17 The district court then articulated the four Daubert factors
as follows:
(1) whether the technique or theory used may be tested or refuted; (2)
whether the technique or theory has been a subject of peer review or
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of a technique; and
(4) the degree of acceptance of a theory or technique within the
relevant scientific community."
Finally, the district court applied the four Daubert factors to the case,
finding first that Carlson's method was not "susceptible to testing" in
that the results were "subjective" and there was some degree of
"uncertainty." 9 The district court next found that there were no
publications that "approved or otherwise discussed [Carlson's] techniques
for tire failure analysis."2 ° Applying the third factor, the district court
found that the "potential error rate of the technique" could not be
determined accurately with Carlson's method.2 ' Finally, in applying
the fourth factor, the district court found that there was simply

13. Id. Carlson did find "some evidence of uneven tread wear, sidewall deterioration,
abnormal bead grooving, and rim flange impressions." Id. He concluded that this evidence
was insufficient to show overdeflection. Id.
14. Id.
15. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16. 923 F. Supp. at 1520. Defendants also sought summary judgment on the ground
that Carlson's testimony did not offer evidence that the failure was the result of a defect
and not abuse. Id. However, rejecting defendants' argument, the district court found that
reaching the result by the process of elimination was not per se invalid as long as the
methodology was valid. Id. at 1520 n.7.
17. Id. at 1520 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
18. Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-95).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1521.
21. Id. The court noted specifically that there was "no evidence that [anyone] has
tested [these] methods in a controlled laboratory setting to gauge their accuracy in
correctly distinguishing between overdeflected and defective tire separations." Id.
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insufficient evidence submitted to draw the conclusion that Carlson's
methodology is "generally accepted in the relevant scientific community."22 The district court concluded that these factors applied whether
the evidence was scientific or technical in nature under the gatekeeping
rationale of Daubert and that the factors set forth had not been met.2"
Therefore, the district court found the expert testimony inadmissible and
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.24
Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the Daubert factors did not apply to the
admissibility of Carlson's testimony because he was not a scientific
expert. 25 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, noting that the Supreme Court
in Daubert "explicitly limited its holding to cover only the 'scientific
context.'" 26 The court explained that although "Daubertmay suggest
reliability issues fox district courts to consider ... under Rule 702, 'the
trial court's role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement
for the adversary system.'" 27 The court then described the difference
between scientific and nonscientific evidence and found that Carlson's
testimony was not scientific expert testimony because it relied primarily
upon his experience in analyzing failed tires. 2 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the
district court erred as a matter of law when it applied the Daubert
factors to Carlson's testimony.29
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if
and how Daubert applies to expert testimony that is not scientific in
nature.3 ° The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding
that the Daubert factors apply only to the admissibility of scientific
expert testimony.3 ' The Court held that the gatekeeping function as
articulated in Daubert applies to all expert testimony, not just to

22. Id. The court noted that the only evidence submitted was Carlson's statement that
other tire experts use this method and excerpts from the deposition of another tire expert.
Id. The court concluded that the submitted deposition was not supportive of plaintiffs'
claim. Id.
23. Id. at 1522. Plaintiffs had argued that Daubert did not apply because Carlson's
testimony was technical, not scientific, in nature. Id.
24. Id.
25. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
26. Id. (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 590 n.8).
27. Id. (quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.
1996)).
28. Id. at 1435-36. The court explained that a "scientific expert is an expert who relies
on the application of scientific principles, rather than on skill- or experience-based
observation, for the basis of his opinion." Id. at 1435 (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 590).
29. Id. at 1437.
30. 526 U.S. at 141.
31. Id.
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scientific expert testimony.32 The Court explained that the "test of
reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither
necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.
The Court noted that a district court has the same discretionary power
under the law to decide "how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect to its ultimate reliability determination." 4 Finally, the Court
concluded that the district court acted within its discretion when it
decided not to admit the expert testimony of the tire analyst. 35
II.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Admissibility of Expert Testimony Under Frye v. United States

In Frye v. United States,3 s the "general acceptance" test for the
admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony was born. 7 Under the
Frye test, proffered novel scientific evidence was admissible only if it was
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. 38 As the
Court in Daubert pointed out, this was the sole criteria for admissibility
under the Frye standard. 39 This test was adopted by a majority of
jurisdictions to determine the admissibility of novel scientific expert
testimony.40 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
announced its decision in Frye in 1923 in a two-page opinion.41 The
court examined the issue of whether a type of lie-detecting method was
admissible in a criminal case.42
The court determined that the
proffered evidence was inadmissible because it had not gained general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community."

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 142 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997)).
Id.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
293 F. at 1014.
509 U.S. at 589.
Id. at 585.
293 F. at 1013-14.
Id. at 1013. More specifically, defendant proffered evidence of a "systolic blood

pressure deception test." Id.
43. Id. at 1014. In its most quoted passage, the court in Frye stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced form a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
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Commentators and courts alike have debated the application of Frye
for decades. One advantage with the Frye rule was that it relieved
courts of the duty to make an independent determination on the
reliability of scientific evidence." This, in turn, reduced the need for
spending the court's time and attention on these rulings through
hearings, and it permitted the court to leave the determination to the
scientific community, which many felt was the proper place for the
decision to be made.4 5
However, many commentators have noted Frye's disadvantages. For
example, the test tended to be inflexible because new scientific knowledge and technology that may be both relevant and reliable would be
considered inadmissible if the scientific community had not yet widely
accepted it. 4 s Furthermore, the courts. struggled to determine how to

define the relevant scientific community, just what scope the term
"general acceptance" included, whether the standard applied to both "the
underlying principle and the technique applying it," and whether to
apply Frye only to novel scientific evidence or to all scientific evidence.47 While the Frye test stood dominant for decades, the debate
raged on.48
B. Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Enactment of Rule 702
The conflict among the circuits over application of the Frye test after
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence was indicative of the
general confusion and growing disapproval of the test.49 The enactment
of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 did little to reduce
the confusion concerning the proper test that should be applied."°

particular field in which it belongs.

Id.
44.

29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 6266 (1997).
45. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1980).
46. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 44.
47. Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1210-12.
48. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 44; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 87475 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency
of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin
Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992); Roger S. Hanson & James Alphonzo, Frye is
Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (1989); Bert Black, A
Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988); Giannelli, supra
note 45.
49. Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1228-31.
50. Id. at 1228-29.
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First, the Federal Rules of Evidence did not codify Frye.5 In fact, the
drafting history of Rule 702 does not give any guidance because it does
not address Frye.52 Finally, the Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole
"adopted a liberal approach toward admitting relevant evidence." 8
This led many commentators to the conclusion that Frye did not survive
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 4
The courts were split concerning the application of Frye after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 5 Some held that the Rules
superceded Frye, while others manipulated the test or rejected it for
other reasons56 and began using a reliability standard promulgated
primarily from Rule 702. 57 The Second Circuit, in United States v.
Williams,5" declined to follow the Frye standard and adopted an
examination of reliability through the application of several factors.59
The court in Williams examined the admissibility of spectrographic voice
analysis evidence in a criminal case.6 ° The court noted specifically that
cannot rest solely on a process of
"[a] determination of reliability
'counting [scientific] noses.'" 6' The court further noted that the
determination of the admissibility of scientific evidence should not be
delegated to scientists, regardless of the "'voting' pattern."62 The court
These
then articulated several factors that indicate reliability.'
include the potential rate of error, the existence and maintenance of
standards, the care taken with the methodology, and similarity with
other scientific techniques." The holding in Williams, as emphasized
in United States v. Jakobetz,"5 was that Rule 702 had superceded the
Frye general acceptance standard and created a more liberal approach
to the examination of the reliability of scientific expert testimony.6

51.

Id. at 1229.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 44.
Id.
Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1228.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).

58. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1198-99.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1198-99.
65. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 794 (citing Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198).
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Similarly, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Downing," examined
the exclusion of expert testimony of an eyewitness identification
expert.6" The court rejected the Frye test primarily because of policy
considerations and employed a reliability standard formulated by the
court from Rule 702.9 The court noted many of the criticisms and
concerns that arose in applying the Frye test.70 For example, the court
noted that the Frye test relied upon vague terms that "have allowed
courts to manipulate the parameters of the relevant 'scientific commun71
ity' and the level of agreement needed for 'general acceptance.'"
Further, the court recognized that reliable novel scientific techniques
could be excluded under Frye, "thereby unnecessarily impeding the
truth-seeking function of litigation."7 2 Finally, the court noted that the
Frye test was conservative in its approach and "at odds with the spirit,
if not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence." 73 The
court therefore rejected the general acceptance standard as an "independent controlling standard of admissibility."74

The courts remained divided on the applicability of Frye after the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.75 While a majority of
courts still followed the general acceptance standard, there were a
growing number of courts that rejected the Frye standard. 7' The
conflict among the circuits and the confusion in the application of Frye
and Rule 702 remained unresolved until 1993, eighteen years after the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
C.

Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert
Oddly enough, the Supreme Court did not address the coexistence of
the Frye general acceptance test and Rule 702 until 1993 in Daubert.77
In Daubert the Court held that the enactment of the Federal Rules of

67.
68.

753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1226.

69. Id. at 1237. The court held specifically on this issue that "a particular degree of
acceptance of a scientific technique within the scientific community is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is, however, one factor that a district court
normally should consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon the technique."

Id.
70. Id. at 1236-37 (citing Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1208-21).
71.
72.

Id. at 1236.
Id.

73.

Id. at 1237.

74.
75.

Id.
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 44.

76. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
77. Id. at 585-90.

20001

KUMHO TIRE CO.

1333

Evidence superceded Frye.7" The Court's analysis focused on the facts
that nothing in the text of Rule 702 supported the general acceptance
standard and that the standard was inconsistent with the "'liberal thrust'
of the Rules. 79 Furthermore, the Court did not limit application of the
reliability examination under Rule 702 to novel scientific evidence, but
included all scientific expert evidence.80 The Court then adopted a test
similar to that in Williams, holding that application of a nonexclusive
list of factors should be applied by district courts to determine the
reliability of scientific expert testimony.8 1 These factors include
whether the theory or technique (1) "can be (and has been) tested," (2)
has been the subject of "peer review and publication," (3) has a "known
or potential rate of error," and (4) has been "general[ly] accept[ed]"
within "a relevant scientific community."

2

The Court emphasized that

the test for admissibility under Rule 702 was a flexible one, but that it
nonetheless delegated to trial court judges a "gatekeeping role"
concerning the reliability of evidence. 3
While Daubert seemed to put an end to the confusion regarding the
application of the general acceptance standard and Rule 702, it also
created some confusion of its own. The Court in Daubert seemed to limit
its holding to scientific expert testimony. 4 The circuit courts applying
Daubert have not taken a uniform approach-some courts limited
application of Daubert to scientific expert testimony, while other courts
applied the standard to technical and other types of expert testimony.8 5
8
For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Cummins v. Lyle Industries,"
held that the Daubert factors apply to the admissibility of expert
testimony other than scientific expert testimony.8 7 The court examined
the language from Daubert and noted that while the holding in Daubert
was limited to scientific expert testimony, the Supreme Court stated that
"its holding was not limited to cases involving 'novel' scientific theo-

78. Id. at 589.
79. Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
80. Id. at 592 n.11. The court noted that "the requirements of Rule 702 (do not] apply
specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence." Id.
81. Id. at 593-94.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 594-95.
84. Id. at 597,
85. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 146-47 (citing Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984,
990-91 (5th Cir. 1997); Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (10th Cir.
1996)).
86. 93 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. Id. at 367.
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ries. "s Finally, the court concluded that the "task of the district court
remain[ed] essentially the same-to ensure that the evidentiary
89
submission is of an acceptable level of 'evidentiary reliability.'
However, the Tenth Circuit, in Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc.,9°
concluded that the Daubert analysis does not apply to the admissibility
of all kinds of expert testimony.91 The court first examined the
application of Rule 702 that the Tenth Circuit used prior to Daubert.s2
The court noted that the "touchstone" in its Rule 702 analysis with
regard to admissibility was "'helpfulness to the trier of fact,' 93 and "'as
long as a logical basis exists for an expert's opinion ... the weaknesses
in the underpinnings of the opinion[] go to the weight and not the
admissibility of the testimony.'"94 The court explained that this Rule
702 analysis was applicable to determine the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony and that the Daubert factors only applied to
scientific expert testimony.95 The court reasoned that application of the
Daubert factors was a further Rule 702 inquiry under certain circumstances.96 The court recognized the gatekeeping duty from Daubert, but
concluded that the Daubert factors were not applicable in cases
"where
"9v
expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training.
In conclusion, Daubert answered a question that had lingered for over
a decade: whether the Frye general acceptance standard was applicable
after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence."' However, by
limiting its holding to scientific expert testimony, the Supreme Court left
a gap in the application of Rule 702 that the circuit courts subsequently
filled inconsistently.9 9
The Supreme Court addressed this issue
specifically in Kumho 71re in 1999.

88. Id. at 367 n.2 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11).
89. Id. (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 590).
90. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 1518.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Werth v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643, 648 (10th Cir. 1991)).
94. Id. (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 663 (11th Cir. 1988))
(alteration by court).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1518.
509 U.S. at 589.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
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III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
Writing for an eight-to-one majority, Justice Breyer delivered the
opinion of the Court in Kumho Tire.'00 The Court reversed the circuit
court and held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in
applying the Daubert factors to expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs
even though it was not scientific expert testimony.' ° ' Justice Breyer
began his analysis by examining the plain language of Rule 702, and he
determined that it "[made] no relevant distinction between 'scientific'
knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge."' °2 The
Court explained first that the language of the Rule covered all types of
expert testimony.' 3 The Court further examined the language of the
Rule and determined, as it had in Daubert, that the key word was
"knowledge," which modified the words "expert testimony"; as such, the
"reliability standard" of the Rule applies to particular types of knowledge
covered by the Rule.' °4 As the Court further explained, the words
"scientific," "technical," and "other specialized" simply describe the types
of "knowledge" that may be classified as expert testimony.'0 5 The
Court concluded that "as a matter of language, the Rule applies its
reliability standard to all 'scientific,' 'technical,' or 'other specialized'
matters within its scope."' °
The Court then analyzed the rationale and policy concerns as to the
practical application of the Rule. The Court noted that expert testimony
that was not scientific in nature was given the same "testimonial
latitude" as expert testimony that was considered scientific. 10 7 The
Court explained that under Rules 702 and 703, all expert witnesses are
permitted "testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on the

100. Justice Stevens joined in parts I and II, but dissented as to part III. Justice Scalia
filed a concurring opinion that Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined.

101. 526 U.S. at 141-42.
102. Id. at 147. Rule 702 provides, "Ifscientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.

103. 526 U.S. at 147.
104. Id. The Court conceded "that Daubert referred only to 'scientific' knowledge ...
'because that was the nature of the expertise' at issue." Id. at 147-48 (quoting Daubert,509
U.S. at 590 n.8).

105. Id. at 147 (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 589-90).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 592). The testimonial latitude generally available
to expert witnesses includes the ability to give opinions, to offer opinions outside personal

knowledge, and to answer hypothetical questions. Id.
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'assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of his discipline.' ' 08
The Court also
recognized that practical application of a rule that created a distinction
between scientific and other types of expert testimony would be
administratively difficult, if not impossible. 109 The Court observed that
"[there is no clear line that divides the one from the others.""0 The
Court explained not only that would it be difficult to distinguish between
"[plure scientific theory" and "observation and engineered machinery,"
but also that the approach would not produce "clear legal lines capable
of application in particular cases.""' Finally, the Court noted that this
distinction is unnecessary because the reason for the rule is to assist the
jury in evaluating foreign experiences." 2 The Court explained that
expert testimony that focuses on "specialized observations, the specialized translation of those observations into theory, a specialized theory
itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case, ... will
rest 'upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury's]
own.'" 113 To further its goal of assisting juries in evaluating foreign
experiences, the Court concluded that the trial judge should evaluate the
relevance and reliability of the testimony regardless of whether it is
scientific.""
The Court then examined more specifically the factors that may be
used in determining reliability of expert testimony under Daubert's
gatekeeping obligation." 5 While the Court held that the articulated
factors from Daubert may be used by the trial judge in evaluating the
testimony of the engineering expert, the Court focused on the word
"may" and emphasized that the application is "flexible.""8 The Court
noted that the factors articulated in Daubert "do not constitute a
'definitive checklist or test.'""' 7 The Court further noted that determining what factors to use when assessing reliability cannot be

108. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). The Court parenthetically noted that in
Daubert it discussed an element of this testimonial latitude by pointing out that expert
witnesses may testify concerning their opinions regardless of whether these opinions are
based upon firsthand knowledge or observation. Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 148.

111. Id. The Court cited as illustrations several amicus curiae, some arguing that
engineering is a science and others arguing the opposite. Id.
112. Id. at 148-49.
113. Id. (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and PracticalConsiderationsRegarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)) (alteration by court).

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id. (citing Daubert,509 U.S. at 594).
Id. (quoting Daubert,509 U.S. at 593).
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articulated in a rule, or even a set of rules, because "[t]oo much depends
upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue. " "'
The Court "agree[d] with the Solicitor General that '[tihe factors
identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing
reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular
expertise, and the subject of his testimony.'"" 9 The Court concluded
that the factors articulated in Daubert may be used with expert
testimony "where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of
expert testimony" because this 120is consistent with the objective of

Daubert's gatekeeping obligation.

After analyzing the proper approach to Daubert's gatekeeping
obligation concerning expert testimony, the Court explained the
discretionary nature of the trial court's determination of the reliability
of expert testimony.' 2 ' The Court noted that a trial judge has discretionary authority to determine whether to admit or exclude expert
testimony and, therefore, concluded that consistency demanded that this
same discretionary authority be granted regarding how the trial judge
determines reliability of expert testimony.122 The Court explained that
discretionary authority was needed "to avoid unnecessary 'reliability'
proceedings in ordinary cases... and to require appropriate proceedings
in the less usual or more complex cases." 123 Finally, the Court noted

that this approach was consistent with the policy underlying the Federal
Rules of1Evidence requiring that "unjustifiable expense and delay" be
avoided. 24
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court in Kumho Tire addressed the proper application
of the Daubertfactors and the district court's obligation as a gatekeeper
in the admissibility of all expert testimony. While the district courts
have broad discretion and flexibility in the application of this gatekeeping function, expert testimony must be examined for both relevance and
reliability.125 This decision, along with Daubert, attempts to settle
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709)) (second alteration by court).
120. Id. at 152.
121. Id. The Court noted that this discretion is warranted whether the trial court is
determining the reliability of expert testimony or determining if "special briefing or other
proceedings are needed to investigate reliability." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 152-53 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).

125. Id. at 152.
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decades of confusion among the circuits concerning the proper approach
for examining the reliability of expert testimony. The holding in Kumho
Tire creates a uniform obligation and approach, albeit with broad
discretion and flexibility, in the examination of all expert testimony
under Rule 702.126 This approach is preferable over both the Frye and
Daubert tests-as applied only to scientific expert testimony by some
courts-because it addresses all types of expert testimony and closes the
gaps historically left by these other approaches.
However, it remains to be seen if the district courts will uniformly
apply Rule 702 to the admissibility of expert testimony with the same
rigor. Because of the flexibility of the standard articulated in Kumho
Tire, there is a possibility that some courts will examine the admissibility of expert testimony with greater rigor and will be more willing to
exclude expert testimony that has been generally accepted under
previous standards. Significantly, the Supreme Court did not apply Rule
702 to disqualify certain classes of expert testimony, but focused on the
methodology of the particular expert in that case, reserving the
possibility that another expert employing reliable methods and reaching
the same result could properly testify. Because the procedure now
requires the judge to evaluate the merits of all expert testimony without
deference to "recognized" fields of reliable expertise, new and innovative
technological advances, not having been accepted widely by the scientific
community, may be utilized by experts to assist the jury as long as the
methodology used is reliable. Further, areas of expertise that have been
more readily admissible in the past will be subject to more rigorous
examination to ensure that the general area of expertise offered by the
witness, although historically relied upon by the scientific community,
is based on a reliable methodology utilized by the expert offering the
testimony. This focus on the methodology used, instead of the area of
expertise, will probably be the primary focus of the application of Rule
702 in future admissibility determinations.
Several cases applying the Daubert factors to the admissibility of
nonscientific expert testimony since the Supreme Court's decision in
Kumho Tire reveal a willingness to examine rigorously the methodology
of the expert in question rather than qualify a particular subject of
expert testimony as inadmissible. The Fourth Circuit, in Oglesby v.
General Motors Corp.,127 examined the expert testimony of a qualified
mechanical engineer proffered by plaintiff to prove that a plastic inlet
connector for a truck radiator hose was defective. 1 28 The court specifi-

126. Id. at 153.
127. 190 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
128. Id. at 247.
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cally examined the expert's methodology, noting that his entire
"investigation into the part or its manufacture" consisted of visually
examining the part, taking physical measurements of the part, and
photographing the parts."2
The court also noted that plaintiff's
proffered expert did not know what material the part was made from or
how the part was manufactured, nor did the expert perform any tests on
the part.3 ° The court concluded that the methodology used by the
expert was unreliable and held that the district court erred in not
excluding the testimony.'
The Sixth Circuit, in Greenwell v. Boatwright,'32 examined the
expert testimony of an accident reconstructionist and concluded that the
expert testimony met the Daubert admissibility test. 3 3 Plaintiff
argued that eyewitness testimony contradicted the conclusion of the
expert proffered by defendant.3
The court noted that under Daubert,
the "reliability requirement is designed to focus on the methodology and
principles underlying the testimony."'35 The court further noted that
plaintiff did not challenge "the expert's credentials as to accident
reconstruction[,]... the scientific formulas the expert used[,]... [or] the
physical evidence the expert used." 3 ' The court, therefore, concluded
that the admission
of the expert testimony was proper under the
3 7
Daubert standard.
An examination of these cases from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
illustrates the determination of these courts to apply the Daubertfactors
and examine the reliability of the expert's testimony based on the
methodology used and not the type of expert testimony offered. This
approach not only permits the use of new technological advances, but
also has the added benefit of requiring a more thorough investigation
and examination by most experts preparing for trial because the
methodology of the expert will be thoroughly tested. These results are
consistent with the liberal approach to admissibility underlying the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 247-48.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 251.
184 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 498.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 496-97 (citing United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498. There was a strong dissent by Judge Merritt, who found the expert

testimony unreliable under the Daubert standard and would have reversed because the
eyewitnesses contradicted the conclusions of the expert. Id. at 501-03 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting).
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Federal Rules of Evidence as well as the concern behind Rule 702 that
such testimony be reliable.
Because the district courts have such broad discretion, the implications involve not only the substantive aspects of a party's case, but also
procedural concerns in the area of litigation. In many cases, as in
Kumho Tire, a party's claim relies primarily upon the admission of
expert testimony.'
Thus, the outcome of many cases will depend
heavily on the determination made by the district court judge, who will
place increased emphasis upon the hearing determining admissibility
and the pretrial discovery of experts. While this may lead to increased
costs of litigation in some cases, it also has the potential to decrease
costs by ending some cases at an earlier stage. It further has the
advantage of minimizing the effects on the jury of "junk" science and
experts who work simply as "hired guns."
Finally, in response to the lack of uniformity and the difficulty courts
have had in applying Rule 702, an amendment to Rule 702 has been
proposed. The proposed amendment embraces the trial court's role as
a gatekeeper in assessing the reliability of all expert testimony for the
purposes of admissibility.'3 9 The amendment reinforces the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in Daubert and Kumho Tire by requiring
that all expert evidence, whether scientific or technical, be examined
with the same rigor. 40 Significantly, the amendment requires reliability not only in the methodology used, but also in the application of that
methodology by the expert witness."4 This echoes the concern that
only helpful, reliable information should reach the jury, but retains the
flexibility necessary to further the liberal approach embraced by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In conclusion, it is unclear just how
rigorously the courts will apply this flexible standard; but it seems

138.

526 U.S. at 142.

139. The text of the proposed amendment to Rule 702 reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, provided that (1) the testimony is

sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and

methods reliably to the facts of the case.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE

UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 122 (Aug. 1998).

140. Daniel J. Capra, Evidence Amendments, NATL L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at Bl.
141.

Id.
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relatively certain that it will remain the standard even if Rule 702 is
amended. 142
JEANNE WIGGINS

142. The proposed amendment, if no adverse action is taken, will become law on
December 1, 2000. Id.
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